This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
We investigate the impact of stock‐based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lower‐ownership managers, but higher‐ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Our results illuminate dynamic aspects of managerial ownership arising from divergent goals of boards of directors, who use equity compensation for incentives, and managers, who respond by selling shares for diversification. The findings cast doubt on the frequent and important theoretical assumption that managers cannot hedge the risks of these awards.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ofek et al. (2000) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: