Examines how capital levels affect premiums and shareholder returns, suggesting optimal capital management strategies.
This paper examines the impact of capital level on policy premium and shareholder return. If an insurance firm has a chance of default, it covers less liability than a default-free firm does, so it charges less premium. We explain why policyholders require greater premium credits than the uncovered liabilities. In a default-free firm, if frictional costs are ignored, we prove shareholders are indifferent to the capital level. This is a restatement of the Modigliani-Miller theorem in the insurance setting. An insurance firm incurs two classes of frictional costs: the frictional costs of capital and the costs of financial distress. Altering the capital level has an opposite effect on each class. The total frictional cost can be minimized at a proper capital level.
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Yingjie Zhang (2008) studied this question.
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