The article investigates how foreign states control armed groups, suggesting a structured approach to manage risks.
How do foreign states exercise control over armed groups? State support to non-state actors is never a risk-free strategy. The provision of support to armed groups abroad may backfire as proxies can divert resources, refuse to adhere to demands, or even turn against the state sponsor. To ensure compliance and mitigate the inherent risks involved in conflict delegation, we argue that states make use of ten distinct control mechanisms when outsourcing violence to non-state armed groups: selection, programming, inducements, promises, threats, rewards, sanctions, checks and balances, reporting, and monitoring. In this article, we outline the logic underpinning each mechanism and illustrate how foreign state sponsors around the globe have employed them. In essence, we contend that state support to armed groups is much more formalized, structured, and regulated than what is assumed.
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Karlén et al. (2026) studied this question.
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