Theoretical note resolves duality in the Information Manifold Model, suggesting a unified framework for determinism and free will.
We present a formal resolution to the apparent dualism in the Information Manifold Model (IMM). While IMM distinguishes between the informational manifold *M* and the experiential domain *E* via a projection operator Πexp : *M* → *E*, this distinction does not imply a dualistic ontology. We demonstrate that duality arises as an emergent, epistemic artifact of non-invertible projection from a higher-dimensional informational structure. This mechanism—termed **Projection-Induced Duality (PID)**—explains the origin of subject–object separation, observer disagreement, and phenomenological partitioning without positing multiple ontological substances. We further show that determinacy at the level of *M* is compatible with effective indeterminacy and agency at the level of *E*, resolving the apparent tension between determinism and free will within a unified framework. IMM is therefore established as a strictly monist theory with derived dual-aspect appearance and projection-mediated agency. **Standalone theoretical note (4 pages)**
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Travis Bergen (2026) studied this question.
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