Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) introduce new safety challenges associated with complex cyber–physical systems, distributed control architectures, and remote supervisory operation. Traditional maritime risk assessment approaches primarily focus on component failures and historical accident data and may therefore be insufficient for capturing interaction-driven hazards arising in autonomous vessel systems. This study develops a parallel and architecturally synchronized risk assessment framework integrating System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the safety assessment of MASS. Within the proposed framework, both analyses evolve concurrently within a shared system architecture, enabling explicit traceability between hazards, unsafe control actions, causal scenarios, failure events, and accident propagation pathways. The framework is demonstrated through a case study of a Degree of Autonomy 3 short-sea freight vessel operating in a high-density North Sea traffic environment. The integrated analysis identifies dominant accident pathways related to perception degradation, communication disturbance, authority coordination conflicts, maneuver execution deviations, and incorrect collision-risk assessment. The results illustrate how the framework supports structured safety assessment of MASS while preserving traceability between systemic control deficiencies and accident propagation mechanisms.
Voutzoulidis et al. (Sun,) studied this question.