Keynes's logical, probability relation is not mysterious, Platonic, unusual, spooky, mystical, true, or mystic. It is Boolean

Abstract F P Ramsey never understood what a relational, propositional (or statement or sentential) logic was. Boole was the first to characterize such a logical system as being an argument form that was composed of propositions containing evidence that specified premises that were not demonstrative and conclusion(s) that were related to this evidence contained in the premises. On pp.7-8 of his The Laws of Thought (1854), Boole stated that the conclusion was internally related (logically connected) to the premises. It was F P Ramsey who constantly insisted that Keynes’s argument form was, instead, related to Platonic, speculative, metaphysical relations, as used by Moore in his Platonic Intuitionism, where the proposition (not propositions) was a self-evident, metaphysical intuition that was true. This has led to a disastrous 105-year detour in the fields of economics, philosophy, psychology, social science, behavioral science and history, that has nothing to do with Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability and the logical theory of probability presented in it.