The Regime’s Inner Circle: Experts, Loyalty, and Foreign Policy under Authoritarian Rule in Venezuela

Abstract In this study, I examine the evolving role of experts in Venezuela’s foreig n policy under the leadership of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. While personalist authoritarianism centralizes decision-making around the executive, experts have not been entirely excluded. Under Chávez, particularly in his early presidency, experts contributed to ideological framing and regional strategic initiatives. However, as Chávez consolidated power and Maduro inherited a more crisis-driven and survival-oriented regime, the space for independent expertise diminished significantly. Mostly drawing on interviews with former officials from Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and academic observers, the study traces how expert input shifted from meaningful engagement to instrumental use, ultimately giving way to a foreign policy making decision unit dominated by loyalists. The findings highlight how personalism not only conditions who participate in foreign policy but also transforms the function of expertise itself, shifting it from a source of input to a tool for reinforcing regime survival.