Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism

One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so‐called Three‐Option‐Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases. In this paper, I critically evaluate such attempts and draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with risk and recklessness. I argue that an adequate form of Objectivism must make room for a distinctly moral relevance of recklessness. To assess Objectivism's chances of doing so, I make an important distinction between two ways in which risks can matter morally. As I argue, the kind of relevance which is required for extensionally adequate verdicts in all Three‐Option‐Cases is inevitably incompatible with all plausible forms of Objectivism.