Argues that no autonomous AI can fully control itself without external oversight, implying potential dangers.
Gödel demonstrated that no sufficiently expressive formal system can prove all truths about itself. If consistent, it remains incomplete: there will be truths it cannot derive from within its own rules. This paper argues that autonomous AI systems face a structurally analogous constraint: no sufficiently capable system, under realistic conditions of adaptation and self-modification, can be the final authority over its own continuation. Alignment ensures that a system pursues appropriate objectives. Control, by contrast, requires that the standing to suspend those objectives remains external to the system's own evaluative framework — a condition we term interruptive authority. When oversight is internalized as optimization, the outside collapses and authorization becomes self-referential. We call this authorization collapse. Drawing on a structural homology with Gödelian incompleteness, the paper develops operational criteria for assessing interruptibility in real systems and proposes a Networked Interruptive Architecture (NIA) in which interruptive authority is distributed across dynamically non-collapsible nodes. An Anti-Closure Mechanism (ACM) maintains the minimal divergence — the ε — that prevents the system from becoming perfectly self-consistent and therefore uninterruptible. The paper's central claim is compressed in its title: control cannot prove itself. Every autonomous system that cannot be interrupted is attempting to become Gödel-complete. It cannot succeed. But it can become dangerous while trying.
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Danko Viktor Vidović (2026) studied this question.
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