US–Russia Relations: From Coercion to Controlled Competition: A Transitional Strategic Model

This paper analyses the United States' strategy towards Russia as a transitional interaction model moving from coercion to controlled competition. Unlike the US–China case, where competition is institutionalised as a stable systemic regime, and the US–Iran case, where coercion is directed towards reaching a restrictive agreement, US–Russia interaction is characterised by a dynamic transition from coercion under conditions of active conflict towards a structured regime of controlled competition. The model operates through a combination of deterrence mechanisms, including economic pressure and military containment, and conditional cooperation frameworks linked to conflict termination. Particular attention is given to the role of external actors, institutional arrangements, and the integration of regional and global tracks. The paper concludes that US strategy towards Russia constitutes a transitional mechanism in which coercion serves not only as a tool of pressure but as a mechanism for restructuring future interaction, thereby enabling the transition to a structured model of controlled competition within the broader architecture of US foreign policy.