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Randomized strategies optimize defender and attacker interactions in various spatial settings, suggesting new security approaches.
Strategic Defense Against a Resource Gathering Attacker In many real-world security settings, defenders must monitor a space using limited resources while attackers try to exploit gaps in coverage without being detected. The space may be a shop, museum, or airport, where the defenders use hidden cameras to detect thieves or smugglers, who wish to steal items or conceal contraband. To capture this interaction, Lidbetter and Lin present an attacker-defender game in “A Booby Trap Game.” The defender places several hidden traps within a search space, while the attacker selects a subset of that space to exploit. The attacker’s reward is proportional to the size of the selected subset if the subset does not contain any trap; otherwise, the attacker gets nothing. The article presents optimal (max-min/min-max), or near optimal, randomized strategies for both players for various spaces—including circles, line segments, two-connected networks, trees, and arbitrary Lebesgue measurable, path-connected subsets of Euclidean space.
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Lidbetter et al. (2026) studied this question.
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