Driven by the rapid proliferation of generative artificial intelligence, the computing power industry is undergoing a paradigm shift from traditional linear supply chains toward complex, interdependent innovation ecosystems. This study investigates the evolutionary dynamics of the computing power ecosystem, specifically examining the strategic interplay between antitrust regulation and vertical integration. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game framework involving the government regulators, leading computing power incumbents, and downstream AI innovators. By deriving evolutionarily stable strategies, we analyze the underlying mechanisms of system transitions and employ numerical simulations to explore key parametric sensitivities. The theoretical analysis suggests that the evolution of the AI computing power innovation ecosystem manifests distinct stage-based progressions and threshold-driven bifurcation characteristics—potentially transitioning from an initial efficiency-based state of “natural monopoly and passive dependence” during the industry’s emergence, through transitionary states such as the “comfort zone trap” or “regulatory stalemate” during the expansion phase, and ultimately converging toward a mature configuration of “co-opetition and endogenous growth.” The model suggests that downstream AI firms may benefit from advancing vertical integration, achieving hardware–software co-optimization through self-developed domain-specific architectures, The analysis further implies that the leading computing power firm could strengthen its ecological niche by opening its underlying interfaces and software stacks to maintain its ecological niche as the industry cornerstone in integrated form. For the government, it is necessary to establish precise dynamic intervention and orderly exit mechanisms.
Li et al. (Sat,) studied this question.