This article argues that a Thomistic view of truth suggests a resolution to the Gettier problem, highlighting implications for epistemology.
Epistemologists have been discussing the Gettier problem (GP) for 60 years. Numerous proposals have been suggested to solve it. In this article, I argue that the problem can be dismissed if we consider it in light of Thomas Aquinas’s view of truth. According to Aquinas, there are two types of truth: ‘ontological’ and ‘logical’. Unlike the latter, only God can possess the former. My argument is that the GP arises due to the implicit use of the former type of truth; the latter type, typically possessed by humans, would prevent the GP from arising.
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Roberto Di Ceglie (2026) studied this question.
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