The Moral Permissibility and Impermissibility of Abortion: A Response to Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson, in ‘A Defense of Abortion’, uses ingenious analogies and thought experiments to defend her conclusion that there are cases in which abortion is morally permissible: (1) the foetus is a threat to the mother’s life, (2) the foetus is a product of rape, and (3) where efforts have been made to prevent pregnancy via contraception. Whilst Thomson is right that abortion should be morally permissible in some cases, she is unsuccessful in defending such a conclusion. In this article, I argue that abortion should be morally permissible in cases (1) and (2) as external circumstances (medical conditions or wrongdoers) have intervened and overruled the rational will of the woman. However, abortion should not be morally permissible in case (3) as there is no such factor in the case of failed birth control (assuming that all goes normally and according to plan).