Avoiding metaphysical pratfalls and positivist pitfalls: a user’s guide to analytical philosophy of history

Contemporary debates within theory and philosophy of history consistently fail to address questions concerning the standards of rational acceptability that might possibly be applied to narrative explanations. The norms of interest concern those that would show how a narrative constitutes a rationally evaluable explanation. Directly addressing the norming of narrative requires at first pass determining a structure applicable for this purpose. A perceived “logical formlessness” of narrative explanations encourages the view of their “evaluative intractability.” To address these concerns, Part I of this essay responds to a criticism of a key element of my account of narrative explanation, one basic to rationalizing such structures and so evaluating them. Part II addresses two related issues bearing directly on evaluation. First, it rehearses a long-standing worry that disputes about narrative explanations cannot possibly be rationally evaluated, viz., the “positivist trap.” Second, it applies the account of narrative explanation from Section I to a specific historical text. Doing so resolves any residual concerns about logical formlessness, evaluative intractability, and so avoids the positivist trap.