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This paper is a review of work on Newman's objection to epistemic structural realism (ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman's objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of the objection are discussed. Finally, in Section 6, three responses are considered that are neutral with respect to one's approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are privileged over others. It is concluded that none of these suggestions is an adequate response to Newman's objection, which therefore remains a serious problem for ESRists. 1. Introduction2. Epistemic Structural Realism 2.1. Ramsey-sentences and ESR2.2. WESR and SESR3. The Objection 3.1. Newman's version3.2. Demopoulos and Friedman's and Ketland's versions4. Replies that Abandon the Ramsey-Sentence Approach to ESR 4.1. Redhead's reply4.2. French and Ladyman's reply5. Replies Designed to Rescue the Ramsey-Sentence Approach 5.1. Zahar's reply5.2. Cruse's reply5.3. Melia and Saatsi's reply6. Replies that Argue that Some Structures/Relations are Privileged 6.1. A Carnapian reply6.2. Votsis' reply6.3. The Merrill/Lewis/Psillos reply7. Summary
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Peter M. Ainsworth (2009) studied this question.
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