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We apply the logical of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government. We consider two strategies that investors may follow: lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure or the reliance on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in that sector on an ongoing basis. We identify political hazards as crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. Finally, we highlight shift parameters in a nation’s institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms. The hazards present in transactions between the government and a private party differ from those in transactions between two private parties. In the former case, both the government and the broader polity on which the government relies for support must be explicitly incorporated into an investor’s choices about the appropriate form of political governance. The
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Witold J. Henisz (2004) studied this question.
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