The linguistic significance of the meanings of basic color terms

THE LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEANINGS OF BASIC COLOR TERMS Paul Kay and Chad K. McDaniel University of California, Berkeley There are semantic universals in the domain of color; i.e. there are constraints on the types of possible basic color lexicons. These constraints arise from the structure and function of the visual system. Thus in the case of color at least, rather than language determining perception (cf. Sapir and Whorf), it is perception that determines language. In deriving the semantic universals from properties of the visual system, one must employ a continuous rather than discrete mathematics, in particular the theory of fuzzy sets. The resulting model of color semantics thus conflicts with the discretefeature concept of semantic primes shared by structuralists and generativists. It is argued on this basis that discrete-feature semantic theories are of limited accuracy.* Introduction 1. Recent empirical research into the meanings of words for color provides evidence that contradicts two widely-held beliefs in linguistics and the philosophy of language. This paper presents a summary of this evidence, uses it as a basis to construct a general model of basic color-term semantics, and explores the implications of this model for general semantic theory. The first belief against which we will present evidence is familiar to most linguists as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There are various so-called strong and weak forms of this hypothesis (Fishman 1960); in all forms, the basic notion is that each language imposes on the individual's 'kaleidoscopic flux of impressions' its own idiosyncratic semantic structure. This doctrine emphasizes the relativity of semantic structures, and minimizes the role oflinguistic universals. The lexical categorization of color has often been presented as a paradigmatic instance of this arbitrary, language-specific imposition of semantic structure. Thus, in his widely-used introductory textbook, Gleason claimed (1961 :4), 'There is a continuous gradation of color from one end of the spectrum to the other. Yet an American describing it will list the hues as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple—or something of the kind. There is nothing inherent either in the spectrum or the human perception of it which would compel its division in this way.' Studying 20 languages experimentally and investigating the literature on colorterm semantics for 78 additional languages, Berlin & Kay 1969 (hereafter B & K) presented evidence indicating that, contrary to the claims of Gleason and others, all languages share a universal system of basic color categorization. B & K argued that there are universal basic color categories, and that the basic color-term inventories of most languages expand through time by lexicalizing these categories in a highly constrained, universal order. In addition, McDaniel has argued (1972, 1974, ms) that these universals are inherent in the human perception of color. The * We have benefited greatly regarding the matters discussed here from the ideas of John Atkins, Brent Berlin, Janet Dougherty, Craig Molgaard, Sue Thompson, Bill Wootcn, and an anonymous reader for Language named George Lakoff. 610 LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MEANINGS OF BASIC COLOR TERMS 611 color perception of all peoples is the result of a common set of neurophysiological processes, and McDaniel suggests that these pan-human neurophysiological processes are the basis of the universal patterns in the meanings of basic color terms. We argue, then, in direct opposition to Gleason and other relativists, that the human perception of color offers an explanation of why English speakers segment the visual spectrum as they do—and why, furthermore, speakers of other languages exhibit the limited and systematic set ofalternative segmentations ofthe color space that they do. Working with a biologically based understanding of basic color-term semantics, we can show the natural relations that exist between the numerous color categories encoded in highly differentiated color terminologies, such as English, and the fewer categories encoded in languages with less differentiated and therefore superficially simpler terminologies. Thus, in extension of the arguments advanced by B & K, we present the lexical categorization of color as a paradigmatic example, not ofthe relativity of semantic structures, but ofthe existence of biologically based semantic universals. A second widespread belief in linguistics and the philosophy of language, challenged by the data reviewed here, is the doctrine that there exist ultimate semantic primes which are discrete...