Nuclear deterrence: the ghost pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

In theory, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is built around three ‘pillars’: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. This article argues that in practice, nuclear deterrence is the ‘ghost pillar’ at the heart of the NPT: a central structure that haunts the treaty by setting strict, non-negotiable limits on construction of its nominal pillars, in particular disarmament. Surveying decades of primary sources, the article shows that despite deterrence not appearing in the NPT text and appearing only ephemerally and insubstantially at NPT meetings, the ghost pillar has always been the core determinant of outcomes related to the treaty. This undermines the foundations of the NPT because, as with ghosts, not everyone believes in nuclear deterrence. The nuclear weapon states and their allies argue that nuclear deterrence guarantees stability and security, and that it will make disarmament possible at an unspecified future time. But many non-nuclear weapon states argue it is destabilizing, creates unacceptable harms and risks and motivates the spread of nuclear weapons and arms racing, as well as preventing disarmament. This apparently irreconcilable conflict between nuclear disarmament and deterrence as security practices appears regularly in official NPT discourse in the form of four broad claims: ‘deterrence is essential, we cannot disarm’; ‘deterrence is dangerous, we must disarm’; ‘disarmament is dangerous, we must deter’; and ‘deterrence will make disarmament possible, but not now’. Unless the ghost pillar is exorcised, it will continue to haunt the NPT and to undermine its foundations.