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Demonstrates improved security of power grids, indicating a novel approach to mitigate strategic attacks.
Modern power grids are increasingly vulnerable to strategic malicious attacks that can trigger large-scale cascading failures. Existing multi-step Markov game formulations often struggle to align with the instantaneous nature of cascading dynamics, potentially introducing estimation bias in multi-agent learning. To address this issue, we formulate the attack–defense interaction as a stage-wise zero-sum matrix game, enabling direct approximation of the underlying payoff structure without temporal credit assignment. Based on this formulation, we propose a Siamese Relational Nash Double Deep Q-Network (SR-Nash-DDQN), which incorporates a structured relational pooling mechanism to capture high-dimensional strategic dependencies. The framework further integrates physics-driven counterfactual experience replay for improved sample efficiency and adopts a two-timescale learning scheme to stabilize adversarial training. Extensive evaluations on the IEEE 9-bus, 39-bus, and 118-bus systems demonstrate that the proposed method consistently approximates Nash equilibria and maintains strategic diversity across independent trials. Moreover, zero-shot generalization across 100 unseen operating conditions shows that the learned policy effectively improves the security lower bound and reduces worst-case damage under severe uncertainties.
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Zhang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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