Seleucus’ Special Military Operation: Imperial Geographic Propaganda in the ‘Treaty of the Indus’

The war between the Seleucid and the Mauryan empires (305–303 BCE) is covered briefly, if at all, in our main literary sources (Appian and Justin). These accounts have usually been accepted by modern scholars with little scepticism, the conflict treated as a minor military operation which resulted in an equitable ‘Treaty of the Indus’, where territory was exchanged for elephants. Such readings are in keeping with the view that the Seleucids pursued a limited empire and were keen to construct a clearly delineated imperial map. This article highlights the contradictions in this current understanding. Rather than a limited empire, elements of the ‘Seleucus legend’ and anabasis which speak to universal imperial claims are identified. I propose that the campaign at the Indus was no ‘special military operation’ but a failed invasion which profoundly disrupted the regime’s expansionist narrative. I argue that a carefully crafted coverup utilised techniques of misdirection, euphemism, omission, and a dismissive colonial lens to minimise the conflict. Consideration of the treaty’s provisions will highlight the strategic and ideological difficulties posed by the war. I suggest this crisis acted as the catalyst for subsequent geographic propaganda published in the Seleucid court, which would influence Hellenistic maps for centuries to follow.