Abstract In his landmark essay, “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson articulated a certain kind of objection to libertarian theories of moral responsibility. In Strawson’s words, the libertarian seeks to provide an “external justification” of our practices of moral responsibility—something Strawson claims cannot be provided, but more importantly, something that he claims is simply not needed. “Inside the general structure or web of reactive attitudes,” Strawson explains, “there is endless room for modification, redirection, criticism, and justification.” But, he continues, “questions of justification are internal to the structure…. The existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justification.” Various subsequent authors have developed this theme to provide a certain kind of argument for compatibilism. One such author—Gary Watson—has called the argument in question the “normative framework” argument. And David Beglin has built on similar themes to articulate the sense in which, for the “Strawsonian”, the facts about moral responsibility depend on the practice of moral responsibility. The purpose of this paper is to examine these Strawsonian themes at least somewhat more closely. As I aim to bring out, it is unclear that the libertarian does or must provide any such “external justification” at all. This paper is most fundamentally a reply to this persistent Strawsonian theme.
Patrick Todd (Thu,) studied this question.