On the Strawson Defence of Instrumentalism: Reflection and Reactive Attitudes

There has been a resurgence of instrumentalist accounts of moral psychology. The new accounts are seen as having overcome traditional criticisms against instrumentalism—and to have done so, centrally, by incorporating key insight from P. F. Strawson’s approach. Call this strategy the Strawson Defence of instrumentalism. The defence is widespread, but I will primarily focus on an admirably explicit development of it by Dale E. Miller in response to criticism by Bernard Williams. The aims of this paper are, first, to show that the Strawson Defence fails to answer the criticism and, second, to show the unimpeded relevance of the more serious aspect of Williams’ criticism for instrumentalism today. While the Hare-Williams debate frames this discussion, as it does Miller’s discussion, its relevance extends to the significant role that the Strawson Defence presently has in motivating a revival of instrumentalism.