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May 16, 2026Theoretical EconomicsOpen Access

How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search

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Authors

TMTeddy Mekonnen

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Overview

Randomized trial examines equilibrium allocation in search markets, highlighting efficient segmentation implications.

Key Points

  • This paper aims to determine how public information provision in search markets can enhance welfare by analyzing market segmentation.
  • Analyzed a two-sided frictional search market with differentiated sellers and buyers.
  • Characterized efficient and equilibrium allocation based on seller type segmentation.
  • Identified conditions under which equilibrium allocation is socially efficient.
  • Established a Hosios-type condition for efficient equilibrium allocation under market segmentation.
  • Demonstrated that the design of segmentations can vary based on search externalities.
  • Identified scenarios where constrained-efficient segmentation fully separates or pools seller types.

Cite This Study

Teddy Mekonnen (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a080985a487c87a6a40b7dfhttps://doi.org/10.3982/te5350
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Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Search Steering in Two-Sided Platforms2024
  2. 2Optimally Informative Rankings and Consumer Search2026
  3. 3Attraction Via Prices and Information2024 · 1 citations
  4. 4Socially Optimal Search Intensity in Over-the-Counter Markets2024 · 1 citations
  5. 5Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers2026