This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind‐reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind‐reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, with its own special principles and mechanisms. We show how such a metacommunicative module might have evolved, and what principles and mechanisms it might contain.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Sperber et al. (2002) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: