Clark Moustakas’ Husserl

This paper critically examines Clark Moustakas’s presentation of Husserl in Phenomenological Research Methods. I argue that Moustakas’s account misrepresents two core elements of Husserl’s phenomenology – intentionality and the transcendental reduction – in ways that directly compromise the foundations of qualitative phenomenological research. First, Moustakas treats intentional meaning as something private, located within the individual, rather than as given in the world. This misreading severs the connection between experience and a shared world of meaning, leaving qualitative researchers unable to clarify participants’ accounts beyond private expression. Second, Moustakas reduces the transcendental reduction to introspective reflection, overlooking its function as a method for revealing how experience becomes meaningful at all. This strips qualitative inquiry of the very tool it needs to examine the conditions of experience. Together, these misinterpretations remove both the philosophical grounding and the methodological framework that make qualitative phenomenological inquiry possible.