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Does the impact of aid punishments on recipient states’ democratization depend on their timing after a coup? In this study, we argue that to prompt donors to lift aid punishments, recipient governments improve multipartyism in elections to signal democratization without endangering their survival. However, prolonged punishment can weaken their motivation for such democratic reforms as these efforts need to be backed by the prospect of aid rewards. We test these arguments using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data from 1967 to 2016. We find that the effect of aid punishments on multipartyism diminishes as the time since the last coup increases. The results suggest that donor states can effectively promote partial democratization in coup-affected recipient states by strategically transitioning from aid punishments to rewards at an opportune moment after the coup.
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Inata et al. (2025) studied this question.
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