This article reveals how segmented globalization maintains authoritarian rule in China, suggesting implications for democracy.
Why has China's integration into the global economy reinforced rather than undermined the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian rule? This article advances a theory of “segmented globalization” to explain how China's distinctive form of globalization creates structural impediments to democratization. I argue that “segmented globalization”—the symbiosis between open trade and closed finance combined with elite emigration—produces a self-reinforcing equilibrium that consolidates CCP rule. First, China's closed financial system channels vast resources into state control. Second, neoliberal export policies paradoxically reinforce financial closure. This export-finance nexus enables the CCP to massively invest in coercion and patronage, maintain the structural dependence of the nascent capitalist class on the party-state, and cultivate output-based legitimacy. Third, elite emigration makes potential agents of democratization relocate abroad rather than demanding domestic political changes. However, the recent US-China strategic competition may threaten this equilibrium by undermining the export-finance nexus that has sustained CCP rule for decades.
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Chuyu Liu (2026) studied this question.
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