Russia's Policy on Nuclear Proliferation and National Unification on the Korean Peninsula

As a N ortheast A sian power sharing a 17‐Km border with N orth K orea, R ussia has a keen interest in K orean affairs. The future of K orea is of great concern to R ussia both because of the K orean peninsula's geostrategic importance and S outh K orea's alliance relationship with the U nited S tates. This article addresses three primary questions: (i) How has R ussia's K orea policy evolved over the years? (ii) What position does R ussia take on N orth K orea's nuclear ambitions? and (iii) Will R ussia support K orean unification? R ussia professes its support for K orean unification. But there are important caveats. Given all the caveats, R ussia will be neither active nor positive in supporting K orean unification, especially since it is likely to be achieved on S outh K orean terms. Will R ussia then tolerate a K orean unification, which is likely to follow the German model of the S outh's absorption of the N orth? Under the right circumstances, R ussia might. In the G erman case, Mikhail Gorbachev as the S oviet leader and the cooperative relationship between the U nited S tates and the S oviet U nion were the keys to the smooth sailing to G ermany's unification in 1989–1990. As with the German case, the state of US–R ussia relations and the type of leader in the K remlin will prove the most crucial factors in R ussia's acceptance or non‐acceptance of a unified K orea. In this article, the author argues that R ussia's interests in and policy toward the K orean peninsula have been consistent over the years in two important ways. First, R ussia opposes any power's dominance in K orea. Second, R ussia prefers a status quo on the K orean peninsula to a Korean unification. The author also argues that R ussia will acquiesce to N orth K orea's status as a de facto nuclear weapons state for lack of a viable alternative.