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We present the Radio Access Network Vulnerability Detection System (RANVDS), a client-side system developed to audit configurable radio access security features in operational 2G–5G deployments without operator cooperation. RANVDS parses control-plane data obtained from commercial devices to infer negotiated encryption and integrity algorithms, quantify the randomness and reuse behavior of temporary identifiers via statistical indicators, and detect permanent identity exposure in paging procedures, thereby providing a comparable security evaluation for all currently deployed RAN standards. Correctness is validated in a controlled multi-generational testbed with known configurations and field measurements from three Brazilian mobile operators across 2G–5G (including NSA and SA) are reported. The results highlight the persistence of weak and null cipher suites in legacy generations, measurable differences in temporary-identifier behavior that can impact practical user traceability, and the use of permanent identity in paging. RANVDS is released as an open-source project to enable reproducible studies and continuous compliance monitoring of mobile RAN security.
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Rocha et al. (2026) studied this question.
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