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This paper models an on-year election in which the presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously. The president is elected by plurality rule and each legislator is elected in single member districts by simple plurality rule. Policy outcomes are a function of not only which party holds the presidency but which party gets the majority of seats in the legislature. Parties are uncertain about the ideal points of the voters. With this model, we show that first, there are some ticket-splitters in every equilibrium, and second, there exists an equilibrium in which moderate voters split their votes between presidential and legislative elections. In addition, when we apply the equilibrium strategy into two-period election, we find this model also explains the midterm loss phenomena.
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Insun Kang (2016) studied this question.
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