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Our paper contributes to this literature by performing a development accounting exercise using a new data set of more than 20 million establishments in 79 developing and industrialized countries. Specifically, we develop a simple model of heterogeneous production units that follows Melitz (2003).2 Plants’ dynamics and policy distortions are as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), but we assume that production units have constant returns to scale technologies and some degree of market power, as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). We calibrate the model to match our data set. Our calibration exercise consists in finding the profile of output taxes and subsidies needed to match each country’s plant size distribution. These distortions should be interpreted as the different types of policies that might generate these effects such as noncompetitive banking systems, product and labor market regulations, corruption, and trade restrictions. For example, specific producers might be offered, by governments, special tax deals and contracts financed by taxes on other production activities, and by noncompetitive banking systems, favorable interest rates on loans based on noneconomic factors, leading to misallocation of credit across establishments. Corruption and trade restrictions might also result in less productive firms obtaining a larger share of the market.
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Alfaro et al. (2009) studied this question.
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