The paper examines engagements between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and civilian entities during the 2004/2005 tsunami relief operations in Aceh, Indonesia. Japan's framework for providing international emergency assistance allows for JSDF dispatch as augmentation forces to the civilian Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) teams. This deployment is deemed compatible with Article 9 and is governed by a separate law from those regulating peacekeeping and anti-terrorism. Asymmetrical field experiences, differential operational structures and procedures, and contrasting timetables of disaster response created tension between JDR and JSDF. As the largest post-World War II overseas deployment, the mission highlighted the forces' inherent mobilization challenges and relative inexperience working alongside civilian humanitarian organizations. The tsunami response offered a snapshot of the interface between local hosts and foreign assistance providers. As host country, Indonesia had no legal basis nor established procedures for receiving international relief aid, including foreign military assets. The Indonesian military controlled relief distribution and strictly monitored both the foreign military and civilian presence, but was eclipsed by the superior capacity of First World armed forces for heavy logistics. Exceptional circumstances of linkages between international humanitarian organizations and the military in relief provision were evident, but functioned mostly as separate streams and networks on the ground, with little crossover in logistics. Notes 1. After the Aceh deployment, the JSDF has also undertaken post-emergency rescue activities elsewhere. These include Russia (Marine Corps sent to rescue submarine in Kamchatka); Java, Indonesia (sent medical team and air transport); Honduras (provided transportation to victims of Hurricane Mitch; Iran (air transport of tents and blankets); Turkey (transported temporary housing for marines) and Pakistan (airlift of relief goods). However, none of these subsequent activities featured the massive deployment comparable to the one in Aceh. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2007, 333, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html. 2. John Cockell, "Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo," Global Governance 8, no. 4 (October–December 2002): 486. 3. Anthony Welch, "Achieving Human Security after Intra-State Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo," Journal of Contemporary European Studies 14, no. 2 (August 2006): 233. 4. Frederick Berklee Jr., Bradley Woodruff and Eric Noji, "Lessons and Controversies in Planning and Executing Immediate Relief in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq," Third World Quarterly 26, nos. 4 and 5 (2005): 797–814; Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald. "The Utility of Human Security: Which Humans, What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow," Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 373–7. 5. Robert Mandel, "Security and National Disasters," Journal of Conflict Studies 22, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 120. 6. In peace-support operations, the lack of clear military guidelines for civil-military cooperation and insufficiency of the NATO CIMIC doctrine with regard to rehabilitation created some difficulties. Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens, "Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan," Armed Forces and Society Journal 34, no. 2 (January 2008): 199. 7. Rietjens, "Managing Civil-Military Cooperation,": 204 8. Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad. Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren and Tim Randall, The Effectiveness of Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response (Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2008), 97 9. Noburo Yamaguchi, "Japan Completing Military Professionalism" in Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 39–40. 10. See Glenn Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996); Gavan McCormack, "Remilitarizing Japan," New Left Review 29 (September–October 2004): 29–45; Christopher Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, "U.S.-Japan Security Relations: Toward Bilateralism Plus?" in Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia Pacific, ed. Ellis Krauss and T.J. Pempel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 55–86. 11. See Richard Tanter, "With Eyes Wide-shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush Doctrine," in Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Values from the Asia Pacific, ed. Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (Oxford: Routledge Curzon, 2005); Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 12. Sandra Leavitt, "The Lack of Security Cooperation between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No," Asian Survey 45, no. 2 (2005): 216–40. 13. While support for JSDF overseas missions has been increasing since 1992, opposition to the Article 9 amendment remains strong. It is patently evident in various opinion polls that the Japanese mass public's steadfast pacifist inclination has also been modified to accept the necessity of having an armed force for defense and disaster relief. See Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Prime Minister's Office, Public Opinion Survey on the Future Role of the Self-Defense Forces, Foreign Press Center (Tokyo, Japan, 1996). 14. Eichi Katahara, "Japan: From Containment to Normalization," in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 71. 15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Third Party Evaluation Team, Evaluation Study of the Japan Disaster Relief Scheme: Summary of Report (March 2004): ix–x. 16. Shin Ichi Okada, "Disaster Relief," Asia Pacific Perspectives 3, no. 12 (April 2006): 27. 17. The SDF can be deployed overseas under four separate legal frameworks: (1) peacekeeping operations; (2) international disaster relief; (3) anti-terrorism (e.g. Indian Ocean refueling mission by the Maritime SDF); and (4) reconstruction in Iraq. The first two are permanent laws under which SDF troops may be sent to any country. The last two are special or temporary measures. Unlike PKO, there are no parallel restrictions under Japanese law on weapons to be brought or security considerations in the deployment area under international disaster relief operations. However, unlike in PKO where a status of forces agreement is drawn beforehand, in disaster-relief operations there are no standard operating procedures or guidelines for troop activities and movements. Japan as sending country must obtain permission first from the host country for all the necessary personnel, equipment, effects, relief goods and medicines they are bringing in. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2007, 359, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html. 18. With 700–1,000 members, the CRF is supposed to serve as an advance contingent for IPC activities. An international activity training group/unit was also set up to educate GSDF personnel who will be dispatched and to provide support for training and drilling carried out by each regimental unit of GSDF for IPC activities. 19. The JSDF's secondary assignation is in keeping with the Oslo Guidelines provision that the use of military personnel and assets be considered "last resort" in any international humanitarian and civil emergency response. 20. The Indonesian legislature passed a new law on disaster-management in March 2007 (Law 24), which mandates the creation of an independent body, called National Disaster Management Agency. Unlike the BAKORNAS, this new body (to be organized in the next six months) will have an independent budget and greater authority to deploy government resources, including the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces), for disaster preparedness, mitigation, relief and reconstruction. 21. The Task Force, composed of UN bodies, NGOs and international donors, is crafting a set of recommendations for the BAKORNAS to consider in drafting government regulations in line with Law 24. The Task Force identified the following barriers to international humanitarian assistance as: visas for foreign workers, legal difficulties in hiring local staff and volunteers, restricted use of communications and lengthy procedures for acquiring a legal status for international organizations to operate inside Indonesia. Academic Script on the Role of International Institutions and International Non-Governmental Institutions in Disaster Management in Indonesia, September 7, 2007. 22. Colonel Takeshi Moriichi of the Ground SDF was one of the members of this survey team and was in fact, the first to arrive in Aceh. During the January 2008 workshop held in Tokyo, Japan, he shared some of his personal experiences. He said he was very surprised by the kind of media attention he got once he arrived at the airport, with questions about him being the first Japanese "soldier" to set foot in Aceh after the end of World War II. One of the difficulties he had was finding a contact person in the area itself. He agreed that unlike the JDR, the JSDF is at a disadvantage because they have poorer networks with military and people in countries where disasters strike. Other lessons include: (1) the need to shorten decision-making periods to deploy; (2) deployment time for the JSDF needs to be shortened (at least to be comparable to deployment times of other countries' armed forces); and (3) flexibility for rescue personnel in each branch. Takeshi Moriichi, "Comments," Workshop on Civil-Military Cooperation in Emergency Relief, Tokyo Foundation, Japan, January 22, 2008. 23. "Japan military lands in Aceh for relief work," International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/27/news/indonesia.php (accessed August 13, 2007). 24. The JCC was created ad hoc to coordinate the activities of the three SDF branches, but had no independent authority to order the Japanese troops. There was no precedent to this arrangement. A permanent Joint Chief of Staff was finally created in 2006. 25. "Arrival of Japanese troops stirs wartime memories," Jakarta Post, February 3, 2005. 26. "Japan's army shows its human face," Jakarta Post, February 7, 2005. 27. Eye on Aceh, "Responding to Aceh's Tsunami: The First 40 Days," 2005, http://www.aceheye. org/data_files/english_format/ng./ngo_eoa/ngo_eoa_2005_04_00.asp (accessed October 30 2008). 28. These 16 countries are Australia, Brunei, France, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 29. "Japan defense chief visits Indonesia," Asian Political News, January 10, 2005. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2005_Jan_10/ai_n8693305 (accessed August 13, 2007). 30. "UN Chief ends Asian tsunami tour," Jakarta Post, January 11, 2005. 31. Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness of Military Assets, 95 32. The JSDF troops, for instance, always moved with the Indonesian military liaison officer. According to one Indonesian ex-general we interviewed, this is necessary due to safety concerns—that is as host, the Indonesian military does not want these foreign soldiers attacked by GAM elements. Another informant from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) also mentioned having been escorted by the TNI on a relief delivery to an area considered by the TNI as a rebel stronghold. Safety is paramount during the operations as all UN personnel have first to seek permits from the head of UN mission before embarking outside their base of operations. Oftentimes, they were also required to report their location every so often via radio. This is confirmed by Major General Heryadi who remarked in a conference that the TNI is tasked to provide a "thorough protection to all international and domestic missions, most particularly to the spots considered to be vulnerable from the armed separatists." Major General Heryadi, TNI, "The Military Play Key Roles in Disaster Responses: Re-defining Rules of Engagement?" Human Security in Aceh Conference, Bandah Aceh, September 3–4, 2007. 33. Eye on Aceh, "Responding to Aceh's Tsunami," 22–4. 34. "Oxfam wants to help restore Acehnese livelihood," Jakarta Post, January 15, 2005. 35. Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness of Military Assets, 96. 36. Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness of Military Assets, 96. 37. Glenn Hook and Gavan McCormack, Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (New York: Sheffield Center for Japanese Studies Routledge Series, 2001). 38. Sabine Fruhstuck and Eyal Ben Ari, "Now We Show it all! Normalization and the Management of Violence in Japan's Armed Forces", Journal of Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (2002): 15–19.
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