Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Defence-industrial collaborative activities have gained a central stage in the current European debate, based on the simultaneous presence of two systemic pressures (unipolarity and “defence-industrial globalization”) that are pushing EU member states towards more cooperation in these issues. Nevertheless, the European defence-industrial panorama still continues to be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Protectionism, oligopolistic market straining and primary resource to domestic suppliers have prevented a more structured defence-industrial cooperation.The aim of this article is to add empirical evidence to recent academic works that highlighted how relative gains play a key role in understanding the simultaneous presence of cooperation and conflict in the European security architecture. In doing so, this analysis focuses on the European defence-industrial landscape and specifically on British, French and Italian preferences towards armaments cooperation. To preview the conclusions, France, Italy and the UK have constantly pursued greater intra-European cooperation, in order to increase their power within the international defence-industrial market. However, they have refused to participate in European defence-industrial initiatives when other countries would have a greater advantage from this cooperation. This happened despite strong geopolitical and strategic incentives to cooperate.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Antonio Calcara (2018) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: