Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
The article examines the methodological possibilities of theories of institutional borrowing (in particular, import and transplantation of institutions) in the field of studying innovations in electoral governance. Limitations are identified for applying the diffusion of innovation theory and theory of policy diffusion to study the spreading of state institutions. A limitation in the use of particular theories is their fundamental focus on considering processes in the private sector, denial of the agency of state, denial of state interests, and methodological dependence on the theory of rational choice. The contribution of Russian institutionalism to the theory of transplantation of institutions and its adaptation to the study of state policy on borrowing institutions is revealed. The article formulates proposals for supplementing theories of institutional borrowing in terms of governmental decisions to ensure the adaptation of institutions. The possibilities of particular concepts within the theories of institutional borrowing for interpreting and explaining the processes of international spread of electoral innovations are determined.
Nikolai V. Grishin (Mon,) studied this question.