Since 1990, Sub‑Saharan Africa has held more than 200 presidential elections, yet fewer than one in eight have produced alternation — a pattern that persisted in 2024–2025, when only a single contest among more than a dozen resulted in a change of leadership. Why do multiparty elections so rarely lead to turnover? This article introduces the concept of Regimes of Systemic Institutional Capture (RSIC), in which electoral commissions, courts, media, and other institutions become systematically aligned to sustain incumbents. Using a new index covering 24 countries (1990–2024), we show that above a critical threshold (IS‑RSIC ≈ 0.75–0.80), alternation becomes extremely unlikely, whereas below this threshold, elections retain their capacity to produce change. A structured comparison of Ghana and Cameroon illustrates how differing degrees of institutional coordination shape divergent trajectories of electoral alternation. The article concludes that neither electoral reform nor popular mobilization alone is sufficient where institutional capture has become systemic; political opening depends on broader changes in institutional configurations.
Moise Tchankoumi (Sat,) studied this question.