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The early moderns surely didn't defend an embodied, extended, embedded, or enacted conception of the mind, but we aim to show that this perspective can make sense of some of their practices; in particular, the epistemology of early modern experimentation.Focusing on Newton's early optical work, we argue that the epistemic warrant he claims for his experimental results turns crucially on how the experimenter is situated towards gaining particular kinds of maker's knowledge.Our account provides one answer to a long-standing puzzle regarding Newton's method: his appeal to 'compelled assent' as an epistemic standard.We thus provide both a novel interpretation of Newton's epistemology and a proof of concept towards applying tools from contemporary philosophy of mind to the history of science.
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Walsh et al. (2025) studied this question.
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