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This article examines the factors influencing dissenting opinions by judges at the Czech Constitutional Court (“CCC”). We build on the disagreement-identification model and the strategic accounts of dissenting behavior. Our findings do not support the existence of a strong norm of consensus operating at the CCC. However, the complexity of a case, measured by the number of CCC caselaw citations involved, is positively correlated with the probability of a dissenting opinion. Similarly, cases concerning controversial topics are more likely to generate dissents. A placebo test strengthens this finding by demonstrating that randomly chosen, non-controversial topics have minimal impact on dissenting behavior. The effect of voting blocs in the plenary proceedings seems to carry over to the 3-member chamber proceedings. The results also reveal that judges make strategic considerations. When facing a high workload, judges are less likely to write separate opinions, suggesting they prioritize workload management. Lastly, CCC judges do not seem to take into account collegiality costs.
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Paulík et al. (2024) studied this question.
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