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Introduction of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in 2013 by Xi Jinping has caught a lot of attention in the academia. Much research focus has been centered on China's motives for launching OBOR and underlying strategy. However, the reactions of great powers on OBOR have remained an understudied subject. This paper explores the case of Russia's reaction to the Chinese initiative and the interplay among two great powers in Central Asia. This region is predicted to be most affected by OBOR and become more reliant on China's investment and trade, and yet the Kremlin considers it to be part of Russian historic sphere of influence. The relationship between Beijing and Moscow in Central Asia is often portrayed as adversarial. A closer study, based on set of in-depth interviews, reveals a more nuanced picture. While continuing to jostle for power and influence, the two players have developed intellectual and bureaucratic frameworks to accommodate mutual interests, including ideas of “linking up” OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The problems for realization of this vision on arise from the top-down decision making process, low involvement of business community, and China's preference to deal with states on bilateral basis as opposed to the EEU. These problems, as Central Asian case shows, can affect the realization of Beijing's grand vision for OBOR. They can also lead to increased tension between Russia and China over influence in Central Asia in the future.
Alexander Gabuev (Fri,) studied this question.