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In a previous paper, the application of the dominance principle was proposed to find the noncooperative solution of the two-person, two-strategy general sum game with mixed strategies; in the literature, two different approaches are found: a prudential and a Nash approach leading to two different mixed strategies. Also, if the expected payoffs are equal in the two cases, the two strategies are not interchangeable. By the application of the dominance principle to the four combinations of the two classical solutions, it was possible to choose the equilibrium point avoiding the ambiguity due to their non-interchangeability. Starting from that result, it is here below proposed the extension of the method to two-person general sum games with n by m moves. The algebraic two multi-linear forms of the expected payoffs of the two players are studied. From these expressions of the expected payoffs, the derivatives are obtained, and they are used to find the dominating probability distribution on the moves. A conjecture about the uniqueness of the solution is proposed in order to solve the problem of the existence and uniqueness of the non-cooperative solution of a two-person n by m game. The unique non-cooperative solution could be used as a starting point to find out the cooperative solution of the game too. Some games from the sound literature are discussed in order to show the effectiveness of the presented procedure.
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M. Zola (2025) studied this question.
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