The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter

this paper to show that this counter-response cannot be sustained and that the original argument against identity should therefore be allowed to stand. This is no easy task since there would appear to be nothing in the immediate linguistic data to settle the question one way or the other. However, by working through the consequences of the counter-response for the rest of our language, I think it may be shown to be extremely implausible. The paper is in two main parts. The first (sections --) is largely concerned with setting up the problem. We characterize the dierent forms the identity theory can take (section ), explain how the argument in favour of non-identity might in principle break down (section ), present the most plausible versions of such arguments (section ), and then consider the most plausible counter-response to them (section ). The second part (sections --) embarks on a detailed investigation of the diculties with the counter-response. It is shown to be unable to account for a wide variety of dierent linguistic data, that is loosely classified according as to how reference to a material thing might be achieved. Four main kinds of case will be considered: those in which a sort is explicitly invoked (section ); those in which it is implicitly invoked (section ); those in which the very notion of reference is itself used in securing reference (section ); and those in which there is reference to a plurality of things (section )