A Phenomenological Reading of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā

In this article, I expand on the approach suggested by Huifeng and explored in my earlier publications. Here, I approach Prajñāpāramitā as primarily concerned with experience rather than reality or metaphysics. More precisely, I argue that Prajñāpāramitā is concerned with the absence of experience in deep meditative states. I explore the idea of “phenomenological” reading and note how it differs from the hegemonic metaphysical readings in a general way. The resulting heuristic is then applied to reading passages from the opening of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, some of which are apparently paradoxical. At the very least, I show that we are not forced to read these parts of the text as addressing metaphysical issues. I also try to show that the phenomenological reading is superior, since it can be directly connected to standard Buddhist soteriological concerns, avoids paradoxes, and leaves logic intact.