It was with some puzzlement that I read Rod Rhodes' and John Wanna's critique in this journal1 of Mark Moore's book Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government (1995).2 The immediate source of puzzlement is that they appear to have read a different book than the one Moore wrote. They accuse Moore of a number of positions that are simply not advanced by him, in the book or anywhere else. Not only are these positions not held by Moore, but in many cases they are diametrically opposite to his actual position. I seem not to be alone in my concern. In my work I meet many senior public managers at Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) and Institute for Public Administration Australia (IPAA) events, and a number of them have raised this article with me, in a similar tone of bewilderment. Those who have actually heard Moore present his ideas in person at ANZSOG programs express chagrin that the concepts could be so misrepresented, and that a framework they have found so useful could be denigrated in this way. At the same time, I've come across others, especially some in academe, for whom Rhodes and Wanna's critique is their first glimpse of Moore's work, and who consequently adopt a predisposition towards it which blinkers them from appraising it realistically, even if they do get around to reading it. It is time, therefore, to set the record straight. Rhodes and Wanna (henceforth R&W) advance a series of criticisms of Moore's framework. I will deal first in detail with their two most important ones, concerning: (1) the political role of managers; and (2) defining public value. Then I will briefly address their subsidiary arguments. Finally, their ‘ladder of public value’ is discussed. R&W's main concern is Moore's advocacy of a political role for public managers. They see him as calling for the elevation of public managers to Platonic Guardians, who have the dominant role in deciding what is best for the public, thereby subverting the legitimate authority of elected politicians: In one sense, if public managers adopt a public value approach they are being asked to rebel against standard politics and usurp the democratic will of governments. Moore comes closest to this when he advises managers to orient themselves upwards to renegotiate policy mandates (that is, overturn the political wishes of elected officials) (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413). Driving Moore's call for managers to engage in politics, they say, is his view that citizens see politicians as venal and expedient, making him ‘uncomfortable with the politics of liberal democracy’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:412). [Politicians] may be able to authorise, fund and monitor, but often they cannot prioritise or give government agencies clear mandates or directions. So, managers need to fill this void at their operational level (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413). Since Moore has to recognise the role of politics, they argue, he compartmentalises it into ‘two discrete junctures’. On the one hand, there is the authorising environment, a ‘narrower realm’ to which he ‘confines democratic (and authoritative) politics’. On the other is ‘small “p” politics taking place in the operational networks in which managers find themselves … Managers have to persuade other significant actors in the field of the merits of their case and the value of the ends they propose’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413–414). They contend that ‘by distancing the authorising environment from the policy process, Moore's description resembles not the cut and thrust of political life, but an aloof judicial bench arbitrating on ideas or granting legitimacy to managerial proposals’ (2007:414). R&W concede that Moore's approach, as they characterise it, may have some relevance in the United States (US) context, with its ‘loose pluralist party system’, but they argue that it is certainly not applicable in Westminster systems, in which ‘large “P” politics sets the decision structures for small “p” politics’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:412): Contrary to Moore's depiction, ministers and politicians are not merely end-users of public value that has been imagined by line managers, but are themselves significant initiators of policy choices. Leadership in disciplined party systems is well placed to impose its choices (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:414). This account of Moore's view of the relationship between managers and politics is misleading, misplaced or just plain wrong, on several counts. Firstly, nowhere does he confine the authorising environment to a narrow sphere of big ‘P’ politics, with a separate sphere for the small ‘p’ politics of operations. It is a construct which comprises all the ‘actors beyond the scope of their direct authority’ (Moore 1995:113). R&W effectively acknowledge that these actors populate both spheres when they cite Moore as saying that managers need them for one (or both) of ‘the following reasons: they need their permission to use public resources in pursuit of a given enterprise; or they need their operational assistance to help produce the results for which they are responsible (Moore 1995:113; cited in Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413; my emphasis). The authorising environment is a single sphere containing many parts – not only elected politicians such as political masters or legislative overseers but also other players such as interest groups, the media and the courts (Moore 1995:120–126). R&W's drawing of a distinction in Moore's framework between a large ‘P’ authorising environment and a small ‘p’ sphere of operational politics has no basis in the book's text. Moreover, it is not the case that Moore sees only a one-way traffic, in which public managers initiate ideas and put them up to politicians, whose role as authorisers is confined to acting as judicial arbiters, and not to initiate value proposals themselves. Moore's emphasis is on the former, but only because he happens to be writing a book about what managers might do, not what politicians might do. Secondly, and probably most importantly, it is simply not the case that Moore is arguing for managers to usurp the authority of elected politicians. Throughout his work he explicitly acknowledges that in a democracy, elected politicians have the most authoritative claim to call the shots: At the core of political management – the actors who are always present and must always be attended to – are those who appoint managers to their offices, establish the terms of their accountability, and supply them with resources. The single most important figures in this context are the managers’ immediate superiors – usually political executives (Moore 1995:118–119). In the end none of the concepts of ‘politically neutral competence’, ‘policy analysis’ and ‘program evaluation’, or ‘customer service’ can finally banish politics from its pre-eminent place in defining what is valuable to produce in the public sector. Politics remains the final arbiter of public value just as private consumption decisions remain the final arbiter of private value (Moore 1995:38). Political decision-making is vulnerable to many different kinds of corruption … These well-known difficulties can and do affect the moral claims of political decision-making on the conduct of government in the eyes of both citizens and managers. But imperfect political agreements entitle citizens and managers to do no more than to challenge their wisdom – not to disregard them or ignore their great moral weight (Moore 1995:54–55). There is a big difference between, to use R&W's own words, renegotiating policy mandates and overturning the political wishes of elected officials. As will be explained further below, the significance of the authorising environment is precisely that it acts as a legitimate limit on the public manager's autonomy to shape what is meant by public value. It is the arena within which public managers’ (and indeed anyone else's) proposals are tested and modified against the stances of elected politicians and those who influence them. This point is made so frequently throughout the book that it would go way beyond my word limit to cite them all. Thirdly, R&W seriously misrepresent Moore's position in ascribing to him the view that politics corrodes public administration. Take the following example: Politics also tries to impose a dysfunctional hierarchic mind-set on managers ‘downward toward the reliable control of organisational operations’ (Moore 1995:17). It acts to sap bureaucracy of imagination …Politics impedes innovation in the public sector … (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:413; my emphasis). Inspection of the cited page reference from his book reveals clearly that he actually attributes this mindset not to politics but rather to what he calls a traditional doctrine of public administration, which further delving shows unequivocally to be the Wilsonian politics/administration dichotomy. ‘This doctrine produces a characteristic mindset among public sector managers: the mindset of administrators or bureaucrats rather than of entrepreneurs, leaders or executives’ (Moore 1995:17, footnote 10:320–22). This is more than just a difference in interpretation. It amounts to accusing him of almost the opposite of what he is trying to say. It is not politics which Moore sees as stifling managerial imagination and initiative, but rather a doctrine which aims to quarantine managers from politics.3 Elsewhere R&W (2007:412) recognise that Moore is talking about the conventional theories of democratic administration, and take him to task for criticising them. By implication, they seem to be defending the politics/administration dichotomy, both here and at other points in their article. I suspect this is not their intent, since as established public administration scholars they would be well aware that the dichotomy has long since been found lacking in both theory and empirical practice (for some critical studies, see Mosher 1968; Redford 1969; Rainey 1990; Fesler and Kettl 1991; Fox and Miller 1995; Demir and Nyhan 2008). The line between politics and administration has been very difficult to draw. Politicians don't always (often?) frame crisp, clear, stable mandates to hand over to bureaucrats for administration, and the latter have to work therefore to crystallise or re-crystallise them. What might seem like technical, administrative decisions can be loaded with political ramifications. Public servants have knowledge not only of the technicalities but also of the politics relating to a particular policy issue, and a respectable democratic case can be made for making that knowledge available to politicians. For these and other reasons, administration scholars have come to recognise that the political role of public managers is more complex than that. One reason R&W misunderstand Moore's position is that, somewhat astonishingly, they completely fail to notice the central construct of his framework: the strategic triangle. Thus having attributed to him things he hasn't said, they omit the most important part of what he did say. Indeed, it is not mentioned anywhere in their This is a like work the theory of The strategic is the that Moore's It that a for a public sector must meet It must (1) valuable public (2) legitimate and from the authorising and and with the available organisational and to produce (Moore and a the to to about among these The point about this for this article is that it that a to the of the authorising environment for a given in to both the permission and the resources and to it. that environment is it is clear, as that elected politicians its most important Moreover, the to and the operational the significance of the authorising environment, since those both resources and to be by that The strategic therefore, that managers cannot just their own by or As both a and a moral they need to the policy they put with political and administrative This on R&W's other that the public value is to Westminster systems with their more at the of which ministers who are by the party to impose their choices. granting that elected have authority over public servants than their or New Zealand – which is – the difference is rather than and does not affect the of the it is that Westminster public managers authorising in which politicians and they need to the point of between value and political It does not the public has to on the for from political For the cited there is a in which public managers a political It is well for that some of the loaded of the such as the on the decision to as one to or the of the a and advocacy role by – even they would it. As Wanna and his put it in their well-known on public management in therefore, is in a can be set of can be cannot be so that they will in … In public sector management the is to the line of to give authority to the who are responsible for the … Wanna and said, it could be that even this public managers to their into policy subverting political is not the same as one by politicians. But as R&W argue with some in disciplined party systems is well placed to impose its (Rhodes and Wanna this is to be at the of elected there is a that public managers will their own the of public that is no more a than the that traditional will to their own a I've heard more than one that the series is a not a of this to remain a process, by in their Moore that it be into the for all to Moreover, he calls for a moral on the part of the public which the of most important is to the for public value (Moore of this role to the of public to it more and These may from but a similar to the public from traditional R&W's other main Moore sees public value being They two positions to One is that he sees public value as a given or an value is not a given … it is to a the of public value’ (Rhodes and Wanna The other is that he sees that ‘the of public managers about the public interest will they these Platonic the to between these of the public a of different of at the public they as the public interest is so is the of public value public value has it is a that within a and its The and it and in of public value (or from single actors that this or that will to public are one can impose a of public value … (Rhodes and Wanna For a public value is not an it is to in what Moore to as the What is valuable to take shape in to the and that in that In this context, public managers may not be able to what is valuable in an sense, but they can to (or the a particular is more valuable than in a given In they can on public policy such as or but these are to not of Moore is not managers’ of what is valuable over those of he is calling for their to be heard in the policy In he is arguing for public managers to put not so authoritative but rather what their might call about what is This is in one of the in which Moore public managers could engage with a series of for public managers to such but in the end the of advocacy about to and political the the one would like to see in in a It to advance their own for the of it them to do so in a way that the influence of those other and their own for (Moore Moore is of the advocacy that R&W on to other to political One of them – public sector – he also it could be as to advance managers’ and therefore to R&W's Moore points to the more view of as to what and to or to those a that with the of (Moore that he against of the in that citizens are not the same as and the latter have from private sector (Moore is that Moore's other – policy and public and – are all in with those put by R&W as but they only acknowledge the and even somewhat … government actors and officials) cannot public but must work others, the of and There is an of this in Moore's managerial which the ideas of and But is made of it in his of to (and the public may a more valuable role in and the of public they may have their own (and can engage in the to the of the public public can the of process, not with of the public interest and about their (Rhodes and Wanna Thus having most of their article Moore's approach, as the very same for managerial in of politics that he R&W put a series of other which I deal with briefly as theory or R&W that it is Moore is a or an This is on a that it has to be one or the But in a particular sense, Moore's approach can be as theory about what be is on some of what Moore can be to argue his case for what managers and do having a of they actually do and in what is that Moore in from operational at the to public value is an for the (Rhodes and Wanna This to be on the that operational are and by that public value is a It with R&W's of management as an some operational can be and some policy can be The throughout the article to and politics to separate is at with the in the strategic that they are and of public managers It is that Moore is in his of managers, and a R&W because of his on the in many are political But Moore it clear that he those who line management positions in or (Moore does on other of such as elected politicians or political – and even on managerial such as and is that in of their work, these other of have important on both the context within which public managers work and their in their But it is important to recognise that he is not his theory on of these more managers it is in an of what public managers do, and this has for the In his is on precisely those whom would as public managers in the Westminster further is that Moore and his are about politics and with their that he is about This is on some about it is to do with the of government actors or with the of government The public value is to that and public to do They are only to and to public value and the public … public do not to to to into work, to at the or to public or … In the of the and its administrative is in the value’ (Rhodes and Wanna This the of the but it is completely the not only in terms of the Moore but also in his framework. of all the cases with which he his rather than of a shows that in they more to the of the mentioned by R&W than they do to Not only does Moore on but he also explicitly the role of the in his public value The use of to or to to to public is the defining of public sector (Moore … government is not simply a it is in the of not This is for against and among These meet not as but as of the to a on of at large (Moore see also and said, it also be that R&W seem to be a rather of the one which the on as and This is on the that with is a of But at two of shows that for a of reasons, only one of which is These of and Moreover, these are often up in complex calling for theories such as by R&W's at the John for and Moore's approach a on the of in the of public by a of but not to authority for Moore private sector the most claim by R&W is that Moore advises public to the private sector and like the public sector adopt private sector to to and public value. … that there are between the public and private (Rhodes and Wanna It is this claim that has most from the managers to whom I have They have been so to his framework precisely because it and what is about their of being by political masters that they the private even it is to do In the that he calls for the of R&W use the that he to those in private even the of his explicitly points the between the two Indeed, it is the of these which the his strategic is in to a but different in strategic in both or but in the private sector this what the to what in the public sector it particular of public which may be more difficult to in but for this is a environment, for government it is a political or authorising and operational to their but in the public sector these not only as do, but also a of in These are only a of those Moore but they that his is to address what is different about the public sector. R&W's is a like saying that is the same as because they both have an a main and on the other hand, R&W have a with the that is, they find with the that public managers their or be of their environment, or and they have probably with the that the work of managers. The only part of R&W's article that to be is their of a ‘ladder of public on ‘ladder of but shows this is merely a way of in a point – that it is for public managers, at in Westminster systems, to engage in The that a public value approach is useful as the level of The with this construct is that it is the or of is not They appear to be to political who the will all the to they that with what they call But in the first there are other kinds of some of which can be even at the case of the at in New Zealand is an importantly, as the of political is not an against and for valuable merely one for to the the most of R&W's critique is that it to be the over the in which public managers have been by the of their political a most in such as the or (for an of the see They put an empirical that being is a and that into a position that managers the task of public value to But as critical will just because is does not that it to The they seem to be has to a of the from an when bureaucrats in some as in the most by such as who that public administrators an to which their and and to be made more to their elected political In my the public position was always but even if it there is a that the is in the other at in the with which I most Australia and its and is to there must be a in which senior public managers able to points or for to do things than they their political masters to be that they usurp the role of elected but it does that the of what Moore calls a is to be Moore ideas for the work of public administration, and most importantly, for about what is from him as a set of concepts in the of the private be with his and to take it
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John Alford (2008) studied this question.
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