Military Keynesianism in the United States, 1949-1976: Disaggregating Military Expenditures and Their Determination

This paper examines "... Military Expenditures in the United States, 1949-1976" at a less aggregate level than was done by Griffin, Devine, and Wallace. Assuming that distinctive and independent causal processes generate each of four subcategories that include nearly all military spending, Griffin, Devine, and Wallace's model can be transposed with little modification to the two most generously financed subcategories, equipment and personnel. However, their model casts little light on the determination of spending for operations and maintenance and research and development. Still, the level of industrial concentration emerges as an important source of spending on military research development, and this fact is consistent with suggestions in Galbraith's discussion of the "planning sector." Preelection increases in military spending appear to be (efficiently) earmarked for increases in the pay of military personnel.