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Our paper investigates how right-wing populists in positions of power affect neoliberal economic policies and institutions. First, we review neoliberalism’s historical development since the 1970s, paying special attention to de-politicization and new constitutionalism used to “lock in” neoliberal policies and the state’s role in sustaining and expanding markets. We theorize that certain aspects of populist rule may undermine neoliberal political structures. To support our argument, we explore the cases of the Victor Orbán government in Hungary and the Benjamin Netanyahu government in Israel. These case studies provide evidence of the re-politicization of economic policies, the weakening of independent institutions through formal and informal means, and aversion to financing norms and rules. We conclude that at least certain forms of right-wing populist political economy should be understood as a break from neoliberalism.
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Yakir et al. (2025) studied this question.
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