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Over the past decade under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has undertaken a vast, comprehensive, systematic project to build a system of “Party law.” The rise of Party law is at once rewiring the Party internally and recalibrating the Party’s relationship with its state. The result is a potent set of tools for putting into practice the notion that “the Party leads everything,” foregrounding the Party in governance processes, and making Party members and organizations more obedient, pliable and responsive to the Party Center. Party law seeks to manipulate and manage Party members’ and organizations’ behavior as they play an emboldened and more direct role in governing China. This article uses two cases from Party law—new rules on filing and review (备案审查) and Party groups (党组)—to illustrate how Party law is transforming Chinese governance. It finds that contrary to conventional wisdom on “institutionalization,” under Xi Jinping, rather than depersonalizing power, institutions that constrain Party members and organizations are leading to stronger personalization. The rise of Party law relates not only to regime “resilience.” It is geared toward pursuing the agenda and aims set out in the doctrine ascribed to Xi Jinping.
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Holly Snape (2024) studied this question.
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