Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines

Abstract The United States increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort, yet existing scholarship has not fully explained why sanctions policy varies sharply across presidential administrations. This article argues that such variation stems from leaders’ causal beliefs about two sanctions-specific factors: the offense–defense balance of economic sanctions and the risk of sanctions backfire. I introduce the concept of a sanctions doctrine—a subcomponent of grand strategy that structures how states design and employ economic coercion—and develop a typology linking four prominent US grand strategies—Liberal Internationalism, Conservative Primacy, Deep Engagement, and Restraint—to distinct sanctions doctrines. While grand strategies define broad strategic aims, leaders’ causal beliefs explain variation in sanctions activism and doctrinal divergence in practice. A plausibility probe comparing US sanctions against Iran under the Obama and Trump administrations illustrates how differences in perceived efficacy and costs generate predictable variation in sanctions policy.