Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
To make a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of an object, is indeed the work of judgment; but the reference of an intuition in general is not. (Kant PC 11: 310–311) 1 The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or non-conceptualized. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualization: in moving from a perceptual experience to a judgement about the world (usually expressible in some verbal form), one will be exercising basic conceptual skills. But this formulation (in terms of moving from an experience to a judgement) must not be allowed to obscure the general picture. Although the judgments are based upon his experience (i.e. upon the unconceptualized information available to to him), his judgements are not about the informational state. The process of conceptualization or judgment takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content). (Evans 1982: 227) I.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Robert Hanna (2005) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: