This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
Massive Internet of Things (IoT) deployments expose networks to severe risks, as a single compromised device can facilitate lateral movements across the entire infrastructure. Traditional firewalls, based on static rules, are fragile, difficult to synchronize across domains, and poorly suited for Zero Trust principles. In this work, we propose a scalable authorization architecture where each flow carries a cryptographically protected token that incorporates a signed and immutable policy, verifiable in a non-interactive manner. The tokens are issued based on attestation evidence, and the messages are reinforced using trapdoor chameleon hashes , which allows for flexible delegation and transferability without invalidating the original policy. Through key aggregation techniques, we enable collaborative issuance, optional anonymity, and multi-party governance. The experimental evaluation in a real testbed demonstrates that the verification of this embedded authorization incurs a fixed and predictable cost—higher than that of rule lookups, but constant regardless of network size, rule growth, or concurrency. This balance eliminates the burden of distributing and maintaining large rule tables while ensuring granular per-flow authorization, privacy preservation, and interoperability between providers. The proposal materializes a Zero Trust model resistant to impersonation, replay, and lateral attacks, and lays the groundwork for future optimizations through the progressive incorporation of post-quantum primitives.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Díaz-Sánchez et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: