Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
In this article, I defend and expand my evolutionary account of consciousness developed in A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness against four critical replies. I respond to de Weerd’s challenge to the evolutionary bottom-up approach, clarifying what it entails. I address Sachs’s discussion of autopoiesis and enactivism, distinguishing my naturalistic framework from these alternatives. I engage Frankish’s concerns about my remaining Cartesian commitments. I reply to Suzuki’s prediction-based alternative to my evaluation-first view of consciousness, his criticism of my discussion of disunity, and his scepticism that consciousness is an adaptation. Finally, I address Chincarini’s comments on the connection between the pathological complexity thesis and animal welfare science.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Walter Veit (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: